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REINING IN STATE STANDING
Ann Woolhandler* & Michael G. Collins**
INTRODUCTION
In upholding standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Stevens said that
states “are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”1 While one might agree that the states are not normal litigants,2 that
abnormality might well suggest that states should get standing less easily than
private parties.3
As a historical matter, states were limited in the kinds of cases they could
bring in the federal courts. States typically could not litigate their sovereignty
interests (their powers to govern to the exclusion of other governments), nor
could they litigate their parens patriae interests (the interests of their citizens)
against the federal government. Rather, state standing in the federal courts
was traditionally available only when states had common-law or equity actions
similar to those of ordinary litigants. State standing, however, expanded in
the twentieth century, sometimes allowing litigation of sovereignty and parens
patriae interests. And to the extent states rely on standing similar to individu© 2019 Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William Minor Lile Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
** Joseph M. Hartfield Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Our thanks to
Katherine Mims Crocker, John Harrison, Jonathan Nash, Caleb Nelson, and George
Rutherglen for comments, and to Tyler Green and Rebecca Lamp for research assistance.
1 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); see also id. (“It is of considerable relevance that the party
seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992)], a private individual.”).
2 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1105
(2015) (noting that the Court’s development of the current tripartite standing test mostly
involved private parties and that concepts related to such challenges are awkward when
applied to governments as plaintiffs or appellants); id. at 1109–10 (suggesting that the
Court should make explicit that standing for private parties and states differ in some contexts, although not venturing into specifics).
3 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 851, 854–55 (2016) (arguing that states should not be entitled to special solicitude in
standing, except where they “seek to enforce or defend state law” and “to challenge federal
statutes and regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the continued enforceability of, state law,” and asserting that states “do not have a special interest in the manner in
which the federal executive enforces federal law” (emphasis omitted)).
2015
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als, the current injury-in-fact test further increased states’ ability to sue.
Indeed, as applied to states, we suggest that the injury-in-fact test poses no
significant limitation on standing to sue the federal government.
If one believes that standing doctrine is an important structural limitation on the federal courts’ ability to make pronouncements of law restraining
the political branches and other parties,4 then the upsurge of state-initiated
suits is a matter of concern.5 Some critics of the injury-in-fact test, even as
applied to individuals, suggest that courts should look more directly at
whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. Cause-of-action analysis in turn
would focus on a “substantive judgment[ ] concerning the protections that
particular provisions of law confer.”6 Greater focus on the protections that
the Constitution and statutes confer, however, is unlikely to significantly limit
state standing. States might easily claim they are the intended beneficiaries
of many constitutional provisions as well as of regulatory statutes.
Limiting state standing through focus on cause of action rather than
injury in fact may thus require a return to a general presumption that the
interests that the Constitution and regulatory statutes protect, particularly in
Article III courts, are the interests of individuals. Under such a presumption,
state sovereignty interests and parens patriae interests should not generally
give the states causes of action against the federal government.7 And as to
allegations of more individualized state injuries in fact, states should presumptively be limited to bringing suits only when they are the objects of federal government regulation.
I. CATEGORIES

OF

STATE STANDING

State standing tends to fall into the following categories.8 While scholars
sometimes vary their terminology, the categories below roughly correspond
to the terminology in state complaints, and in judicial decisions evaluating
state standing.
4 PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL 5 (2015) (expressing concerns in the context
of state standing for the “increasing judicialization of American politics,” and concerns as
to muddying accountability); Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 42, 45–47), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3134464 (arguing that limits on standing constrain and protect the
judiciary).
5 Grove, supra note 3, at 856 (“[A] more expansive definition of special state standing
might threaten to erode the limits on the Article III judicial power—by enabling every
dispute between a State and the federal government to wind up in court.”); see also infra
text accompanying notes 71–80.
6 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 1068–69, 1108; see also infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
7 This Essay particularly focuses on the state suits against the federal government or
federal officials.
8 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1109 n.276 (citing Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 213–14 (2014) (using this terminology but
noting variants)); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L.
REV. 2051, 2056, 2064 (2011) (providing categories of state standing).
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1. Enforcement interests.9 State enforcement interests are implicated
when a state brings an action to enforce state legislation in its own courts
against private parties. For example, a state prosecution for murder in a state
court vindicates state enforcement interests. A civil action that a state official
brings to enforce state legislation also vindicates enforcement interests.
2. Sovereignty interests. State sovereignty interests are implicated when
the government sues to vindicate its power to govern with respect to a particular subject matter or in a particular territory.10 When Massachusetts sued a
federal official alleging that federal spending on maternal health exceeded
congressional powers, it sought to vindicate its claim that only states had the
authority to spend or regulate as to that subject.11
3. Quasi-sovereign or parens patriae interests. These interests are those
attributable to citizens of a state, such as interests in the environment. When
a state sues an alleged polluter because of harms to the health of its citizens,
it is vindicating a parens patriae interest.12
4. Proprietary or individual interests. Individual interests are state interests comparable to the interests that allow a private party to bring suit. For
example, if a state sues to collect on certain bonds that it owns, it is suing to
vindicate a proprietary or individual interest.13
II. TRADITIONAL LIMITS

ON

STATE STANDING

The states’ pursuit of their enforcement interests in their own courts,
with the possibility of Supreme Court review, presents the paradigm of the
state as litigant. The Constitution, of course, provided for original Supreme
Court jurisdiction over controversies in which a state was a party,14 thus contemplating that a state might appear as a plaintiff in original civil actions in a
federal court. At the same time, the Constitution’s placing original state-asparty jurisdiction in the Supreme Court suggested that states would not be
plaintiffs in the federal courts very often. And indeed, the Supreme Court
restricted state-as-party suits.
First, the Court indicated that, as a general matter, state sovereignty
interests did not give states claims for relief.15 For example, when Georgia
sued federal government officials in Georgia v. Stanton to challenge the consti9 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387,
411 (1995).
10 See Crocker, supra note 8, at 2053; see also id. at 2055 (stating that quasi-sovereign
interests are representative, while sovereign interests are those central to the core of
governing).
11 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
12 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.497, 519–20 (2007) (relying in part on quasisovereign interests).
13 See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2.
15 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831); id. at 28–29
(Johnson, J., concurring); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 413–14 (discussing Cherokee Nation).
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tutionality of Reconstruction, the Court stated that such claims involved nonlitigable “rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of
corporate existence as a State.”16 Border disputes between states, however,
were an early exception; the Framers apparently had contemplated that such
suits would be handled by the Supreme Court, and they resembled commonlaw claims for property between individuals.17
When the state and federal governments did have disputes about
whether one government was trenching on the governing powers of the
other, such disputes would typically be litigated by either government enforcing its own laws in its own courts against individuals who had violated them.18
For example, when Georgia claimed that it could regulate in the Indian territory contained within Georgia borders, it passed and enforced a license law
against persons working in such territory without a state license.19 The
defendant in an enforcement action raised the unconstitutionality of the
state laws as a defense, and on direct review the Court held in Worcester v.
Georgia that the federal government had exclusive authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes; it therefore reversed the judgment of conviction.20 Similarly, the federal government’s efforts to use military courts
rather than state courts during Reconstruction could be contested on federal
habeas corpus by individuals challenging their detention resulting from proceedings in a military court. And in Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court
held that a military tribunal lacked jurisdiction in states where the regular
courts were open.21
The fact that structural disputes between states and the federal government were litigated in cases between government and private parties indicated that a case or controversy under Article III involved certain legal
relations that did not generally include conflicting claims of power between
governments as adversary parties. Rather, the claims typically took the form
of governmental power (through enforcement) versus individual immunity
(from the power). The form of such judicial actions reinforced the notion
that individuals are the ultimate beneficiaries of even structural constitutional limitations,22 and that the federal courts’ role was to protect private
rights, not directly to resolve political disputes between contending sover16 Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867); see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866) (holding that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to issue an injunction preventing President Johnson from enforcing the Reconstruction Acts).
17 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 415–16 (indicating that the Court was
willing to litigate these cases in part because they resembled disputes over property).
18 Suits between private parties could also raise disputes about competing sovereigns’
claims to govern. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
19 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536–37 (1832).
20 Id. at 561–63.
21 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119–23 (1866); see Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 9, at 418, 418 nn.110 & 112 (discussing Ex parte Milligan).
22 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 439 (“[T]he preference for state-versusindividual actions over government-versus-government actions enhanced the status of the
individual as a rights-holder against government.”); id. at 444.
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eigns.23 Indeed, the legitimacy of the federal courts’ decisions restricting
political actors is premised on their obligation to apply the law in cases
involving private rights.24
Similarly, the nineteenth century does not offer examples of federal
jurisdiction over suits by states claiming to represent their citizens as parens
patriae against the federal government.25 On a few occasions, states brought
public nuisance suits against private parties in the Supreme Court. For example, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., the Commonwealth
sought to enjoin a privately built bridge’s obstruction to navigation.26 The
Court, however, required the Commonwealth to show a particularized injury,
just as the common law would have required of a private party who wished to
bring a public nuisance suit.27 This result underscores that common-law
injuries, such as might be at issue when a state sued on a contract claim, were
meant to be the grist of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.28 Rather
than receiving special treatment as plaintiffs in federal courts, states were
23 Id. at 440–41 (stating that limitations on state standing kept the courts from litigating issues of constitutionality simpliciter, and limited judicial power by keeping cases to a
more tractable scope); id. at 442 (indicating that judicial power is limited and also reinforced by limits on cases); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1366 (1973) (positing that justiciability doctrines “allowed the
current dimensions of judicial review to become established at an acceptable political
pace” (emphasis omitted)). In addition, limitations on states’ standing reinforce the
notion that the state and federal governments act directly on the people rather than upon
each other. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89
(stating that allowing states to bring suits to challenge federal statutes “would be a fundamental denial of . . . the principle that the federal government is a sovereign coexisting in
the same territory with the states and acting, not through them, like some international
organization, but directly upon the citizenry”).
24 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“The province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”); id. at 177–78 (reasoning
that if a court is deciding a case and “two laws conflict with each other, the court[ ] must
decide on the operation of each”); Bickel, supra note 23, at 90 (arguing that suits between
states and the federal government would aggrandize judicial power and bring abstract disputes before the courts).
25 The limitations on governmental parens patriae suits serve similar ends as the limitations on sovereignty-based actions. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 442–44.
Parens patriae and sovereignty suits are to a large extent substitutable for one another. See
Woolhandler, supra note 8, at 226.
26 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 557
(1851).
27 See id. at 561; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 432–33 (discussing Wheeling
Bridge); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 689, 703 (2004). The majority treated a state loss of tolls on its public works as a
sufficient private injury in Wheeling Bridge. See 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 558; see also South
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 14 (1876) (reiterating the need for a particularized injury
like that of a private party).
28 See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792); Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 9, at 406 & n.58 (discussing Brailsford).
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only given access to federal courts as plaintiffs in fairly limited circumstances,
i.e., when their claims looked like the common-law actions of private parties.
Had it been otherwise—such that states could freely litigate their sovereignty
interests and the interests of their people against the federal government—
many notable cases raising constitutional issues would have looked quite
different.29
III. THE MODERN COURT
The twentieth century saw the weakening of limitations on state standing. Some restrictions nevertheless persisted, particularly in litigation against
the federal government respecting the constitutionality of federal law. A
state’s interest in governing in an area to the exclusion of the federal government—that is, its sovereignty interests—continues to be a doubtful basis for
standing to challenge federal legislation.30 For example, in Massachusetts v.
Mellon the Court disallowed a state challenge to congressional spending on
maternal health as beyond federal power.31 More recently, the Fourth Circuit disallowed Virginia’s suit to challenge the Affordable Care Act based on
Virginia’s claim that the federal government had trenched on reserved state
powers.32 In addition, state parens patriae suits against the United States or its
officials have remained somewhat suspect. When Florida challenged the federal inheritance tax in federal court in Florida v. Mellon, the Supreme Court
held that the state could not assert parens patriae interests against the United
States.33 These limitations on sovereignty and parens patriae suits reinforce
the tradition that conflicts between the state and federal governments as to
29 Instead of the Bank of the United States suing Ohio Auditor Ralph Osborn for
trespass for collecting an unconstitutional tax, see Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824), Ohio might have sued the Secretary of the Treasury to have the bank
declared unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers. Instead of Georgia’s attempting to enforce its own laws in its own courts that limited the ability of nonCherokees to work in Cherokee territory, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), Georgia might have sued a federal official to claim a right to issue licenses for nonCherokees to work in Cherokee territory. Instead of being barred from doing so in Georgia
v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867), Georgia could have proceeded with its suit to end
Reconstruction. And instead of abolitionist Sherman Booth’s having to bring a habeas
corpus action against his federal custodian who held him for violating the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850, see Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858), Wisconsin or any other
free state might have sued the attorney general to have the Act declared unconstitutional
as beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.
30 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484–85 (1923).
31 See id. at 479–80.
32 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011). But cf.
Grove, supra note 3, at 876–78 (arguing that a state has no special standing when a state
law is merely declaratory rather than regulatory).
33 See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. at 485–86 (rejecting a state challenge to federal spending on maternal health, and
holding that a state cannot assert parens patriae standing to protect its citizens from the
operation of a federal statute alleged to be unconstitutional).
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the scope of federal power should ordinarily be litigated as between private
parties and government.
Still, in contrast to the cases noted above (which involved attempts to
invoke implied rights of action to challenge the constitutionality of federal
legislation) courts have been somewhat more indulgent to state standing in
suits challenging federal administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Cases under the APA have frequently allowed states to sue
as plaintiffs, partly under expansive interpretations of the APA’s judicial
review provisions in the aftermath of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.34 For example, states have been allowed to challenge
agency action that preempts state law—which are clearly sovereignty-based
claims. Oregon thus was able to challenge a Justice Department interpretive
rule that undermined the state’s allowance of physician-assisted suicide.35
And in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court entertained a state parens
patriae challenge to the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles.36 While the Court recognized prohibitions on
states’ ability to bring parens patriae suits against the federal government, it
indicated that such prohibitions apply with lesser force where there is an
allegation that an agency is not complying with federal law, as opposed to
when a state tries to protect its citizens from the operation of congressional
statutes.37
To be sure, even in cases in which the courts rely on state sovereignty or
parens patriae interests, the federal courts will generally engage in the usual
standing inquiries of injury in fact, causation, and redressability spelled out
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.38 As part of that inquiry, the court may
require a state to show particularized injuries. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for
example, the Court relied on the Commonwealth’s showing of a particularized injury in the loss of its coastline.39 The courts may make findings under
34 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
35 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006), aff’g Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002). The district court
addressed the standing issue, stating, “Oregon has alleged and proved a sufficient injury to
its sovereign and legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes.”
Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
36 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007).
37 See id. at 520 n.17; see also Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 161–62
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (indicating that the prohibition on state parens patriae standing against the
federal government applied more strongly when there were challenges to statutes, and also
determining that a constitutional challenge to certain policies resembled a challenge to
statutes); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 626 (S.D. Tex.) (citing a number of
administrative challenges against agencies under parens patriae theories based on this distinction), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136
S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 401 (2018) (indicating that parens patriae suits have been
allowed against federal agencies).
38 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
39 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522–23.
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the Lujan factors to support sovereignty or parens patriae showings, or to support state claims of proprietary or individual injuries.40
Whether used to bolster a sovereignty or parens patriae claim, or as a
separate proprietary or individual basis for standing,41 states have little
trouble alleging such concrete injuries. Nor, where applicable, has the Data
Processing requirement that the state injury be “arguably within the zone of
interests”42 protected by the statutes at issue posed much of a hurdle; states
have been able to cast themselves as regulatory beneficiaries harmed by the
federal government’s reduction of enforcement against the objects of federal
regulation. Texas thus notoriously obtained standing to challenge the federal government’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program on the ground that immigrants whose
status was adjusted under DAPA would be able to obtain state driver’s
licenses whose issuance would cost the state money.43 And any adjustment of
state law to make licensees bear the full cost of licensing would itself be an
injury to the state.44 More recently, states have challenged a Department of
Health and Human Services proposal that would make it easier for employerbased health insurance plans to claim a religious or moral exception to providing contraceptive coverage. The states’ alleged particularized injury was
that, absent employer-supported contraception, women would turn to state
services, thereby causing the states to incur extra expenses in funding
contraception.45
40 See id. at 519–20 (relying in part on quasi-sovereign interests); id. at 522 (Massachusetts “has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner”).
41 See generally Brescia, supra note 37. Professor Raymond Brescia takes the position
that states are relying less on parens patriae and more on individualized injuries. Id. at 368.
Because the states often allege a variety of injuries and the courts will normally require
some form of individual injury under a Lujan test no matter what the basis of standing is, it
may be difficult to say with certainty where parens patriae or some alleged sovereign injury
stops and individual injury begins.
42 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
43 See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 748 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
44 See id. at 749 (indicating that a plaintiff suffers an injury even if it can avoid that
injury by incurring other costs).
45 See California v. Health & Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 822 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(finding support for the states’ parens patriae standing in that they “will incur economic
obligations, either to cover contraceptive services necessary to fill in the gaps . . . or for
‘expenses associated with unintended pregnancies’” (quoting States’ Reply in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, California v. Health & Human Servs., 281 F. Supp.
3d 806 (No. 4:17-cv-05783))), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. California
v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 571 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding state standing based on the economic harm caused by women seeking contraceptive care from state-financed programs,
and not reaching alternative theories); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 567
(E.D. Pa. 2017) (finding a “direct” injury in the state to support parens patriae standing
because women will turn to state-funded sources, as supported by affidavits), appeal docketed, No. 18-1253 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2018). For a decision denying state standing, see Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Education, No. 1:17-cv-02679, 2018 WL 4954150 (D.D.C. Oct.
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Given the extent of policymaking that now occurs in the executive
branch, broad APA standing is, of course, important in itself.46 In addition,
standing in the APA context tends to spill over to implied actions raising
constitutional issues, such as states’ attempts to challenge Congress’s limitation on the ability of taxpayers to deduct state and local taxes as a matter of
federal income tax law.47 Whether in the APA or in the implied action context, states tend to pile on multiple bases for their standing.48 For example,
Maryland claimed several grounds for standing in challenging President
Trump’s continued holding of ownership interests in hotels and restaurants
as a violation of the Constitution’s Domestic and Foreign Emoluments
Clauses. Maryland alleged a sovereign interest in not being disadvantaged
vis-à-vis other states who might give benefits to Trump businesses, a parens
patriae interest in its inhabitants’ businesses not being subject to unfair competition, and a similar individual state competitive loss with respect to partly
state-owned entertainment facilities.49 The Maryland federal court upheld
standing on a number of grounds.50
IV. THE PROBLEM

WITH

STATE LITIGANTS

Professor Richard Fallon has stated that current standing doctrine was
designed for individuals and not for states.51 Indeed, both the injury-in-fact
test and the arguably-within-the-zone-of-interests test are particularly ill-suited
to states. Problems arise in trying to limit standing for a multipurpose public
entity by a test designed for individuals.
12, 2018), where the court denied state standing to contest changes in federal student loan
forgiveness programs.
46 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1748 (2017) (suggesting the importance of state
challenges to federal executive action to the new process federalism).
47 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, New York v. Mnuchin, No. 1:18cv-6427 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2018). The states claimed multiple grounds for standing: an
interference with sovereign interests in setting fiscal and regulatory policy, quasi-sovereign
interests in loss of home values to inhabitants, and an individual interest in loss of tax
revenue and real estate transfer fees. Id. at 6–7, 33, 39–40, 46.
48 See id.
49 See Complaint at 5–6, 30–36, 38, 40, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d
725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 17-1596).
50 The district court rejected Maryland’s standing to enforce the terms on which it
entered the union. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 739. It also
rejected standing based on alleged lost tax revenues. See id. at 739–40. The court found
Maryland and the District of Columbia could assert their “quasi-sovereign interests” in not
having to give benefits to Trump’s Washington hotel. Id. at 742. The district court also
found injury to some of the plaintiffs’ proprietary interests, id. at 743, and that the plaintiffs could assert parens patriae standing with respect to competitive injuries to their citizens.
See id. at 747–48.
51 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1105, 1109–10.
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A. Injury-in-Fact as Ill-Suited to States
The historical limitations on state standing were not based on any lack of
harm in fact to a particular state. Mississippi and Georgia suffered injuries
when Reconstruction military governments superseded state power, but the
Court did not allow the states to sue federal officials to redress those harms.
Florida constituents suffered actual harms when the federal government
taxed inheritances, but the Court disallowed the State’s assertion of parens
patriae interests against the federal government in Florida v. Mellon.52 Nor are
the states’ modern assertions of individualized or proprietary interests as a
basis for lawsuits necessarily de minimis or insubstantial. Texas’s expenses
for licenses for DAPA beneficiaries, even if somewhat contrived, were said to
be several million dollars.53
The problem is not that states lack real injuries—whether to their sovereignty, their constituents, or themselves. The problem is that states can easily
satisfy the current standing tests of Data Processing and Lujan. But as the
traditional limitations on litigation of sovereignty interests and parens patriae
suggest, an actual injury of some kind should not necessarily suffice to give a
cause of action to the state.
As applied to individuals and private organizational entities, the injuryin-fact requirement provides at least some limits on the ability of a party to
bring claims under the Constitution or the APA. After all, a private party
does not have limitless interests that suffice to give him or her a right of
action. An internet content provider may claim some injury from the Federal
Communications Commission’s retreat from net neutrality, but it obviously
would not have a claim to challenge the child separation policies of the
Department of Homeland Security. States, however, lack comparable limitations on their interests. Their range of potential interests results from states’
being sovereigns that govern; that are concerned for the well-being of individuals and businesses within their borders; that provide infrastructure, social
services, and schools;54 and that act as employers. And given the overlap of
state and federal regulation, there are few changes in federal administrative
policy that cannot plausibly be alleged to have some particularized impact on
the states in terms of adjusting state services or regulations.55 Even in areas
52 See 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927).
53 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 617 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 787 F.3d 733 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
54 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (reciting
various harms to state universities), cert. denied sub nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S. Ct.
448 (2017).
55 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d at 749& n.33 (citing Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze
v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 232–33 (6th Cir. 1985)) (allowing standing in part
because federal policy made implementation of existing state statutes more difficult); see
also Ernest A. Young, State Standing and Cooperative Federalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893,
1895 (2019) (“[C]hanges in federal policy will almost always meaningfully affect state interests.”). Professor Shannon Roesler maintains that states should have standing “when the
federal statute at issue contemplates an implementation role for state governments,” such
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where federal regulation is more or less exclusive of state regulation, states
have obtained standing based on their being stuck with federal policy.56 One
need only review the multifarious state allegations of injuries, and the district
court opinions applying the Lujan test thereto, to be convinced of the general futility of the injury-in-fact test as a meaningful limit on state standing.
B. Arguably-Within-the-Zone-of-Interests as Ill-Suited to States
Neither does the arguably-within-the-zone-of-interests test provide a limit
on state standing. It is difficult to argue that states are outside the zone of
interests protected by particular legal constraints. Like the injury-in-fact test,
the zone-of-interests test was designed for individuals. It represented a significant expansion of standing accompanying the injury-in-fact test, but still
as in cooperative state/federal programs. Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge
Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 637, 677–78 (2016)
(under a “governance” approach, indicating that federal funding conditioned on state
assistance or conditional preemption would be enough, and the state implementation role
would not need to be substantial); see also id. at 685 (not relying on parens patriae, but
rather on state interests in governing, including as “cooperative agencies”). A party who
implements regulations, however, is not generally thought of as a proper plaintiff to challenge policies for implementing the law. Immigration officers, for example, did not have
standing to challenge DACA as contrary to statutory directives. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d
244, 253–54 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding as insufficient allegations that plaintiffs would violate
their oaths of office, possibly have to change their work in response to the directives, and
possibly would suffer adverse employment actions if they failed to follow the directives); cf.
Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that
a Foreign Service Officer lacked standing to challenge Hillary Clinton’s appointment as
Secretary of State as violative of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, because the emoluments for
that position had been increased while Clinton was a Senator). As Professors Jessica
Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have pointed out, moreover, cooperative federalism
gives many opportunities for “uncooperative federalism,” and such opportunities are not
limited to litigation. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1308 (2009) (indicating that their article focused on political and
administrative, not judicial, resistance); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (2014) (indicating there are “three main ways that states . . .
contest national policy: they argue that the federal government is exceeding its authority
and encroaching on state autonomy; they enact their own legislation to prod the federal
government into action or to set a different course; and they administer federal programs
in ways that interfere with federal goals”).
56 Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d at 746 (referring to the basis on which the district
court had ruled); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 636–44 (discussing “abdication”
standing); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 46, at 1747 (noting that Massachusetts v. EPA’s
“purported reliance on state sovereignty” was “in fact a reliance on its absence. Noting that
the state had ‘surrender[ed] certain sovereign prerogatives’ to the federal government, the
Court reasoned that the lodging of those sovereign prerogatives in the federal government
gave the state a cognizable interest in ensuring the EPA’s compliance with federal law”
(alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007)). See
generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201
(2017) (arguing that federal preemption of state law combined with federal underenforcement of federal law should give state standing).
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promised some limits—given the inherently limited nature of individual
interests combined with the supposed limitations of the parties Congress
might arguably wish to benefit.
Some commentators assumed that broad state standing would not prove
to be a problem because states would show restraint in pursuing alleged violations of federal law by federal officials.57 But state attorneys general (“AGs”)
often seem to have concluded that suing the federal government is more
important than spending the same resources on enforcing their states’
laws.58 Political incentives to sue the federal government may often be high,
and the ability to pool resources with like-minded AGs and private interest
groups loosens resource constraints.59 When states coordinate, moreover,
they can often choose forums where they have a high probability of obtaining
newsworthy successful results, at least initially. In all events, AG incentives
combined with current standing tests as applied to states have provided no
effective limits on state standing, and have made standing restrictions on
individuals increasingly irrelevant.60
C. Cause-of-Action Analysis as a Limitation?
In criticizing current standing doctrine more generally, several noted
scholars have pointed out that standing may be properly characterized as the
injury component of a cause of action.61 They suggest a de-emphasis on
injury in fact in favor of looking to whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of
action. Such an inquiry, they suggest, could focus on whether a plaintiff has
alleged the type of injury that the constitutional and statutory provisions at
issue are specifically designed to prevent.62
57 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1513
(2013); Roesler, supra note 55, at 698 (“Moreover, because states do not have unlimited
resources, they are not likely to sue unless the administrative scheme will have a substantial
impact on state regulatory institutions. In short, the approach does not open the
floodgates.”).
58 Cf. Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing Politics?,
52 U. RICH. L. REV. 633, 633 (2018) (discussing the increase in state suits).
59 See NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 16, 34, 159, 174, 192–93 (discussing cooperation
among same-party AGs as well as of AGs with private groups).
60 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518 (“Only one of the petitioners needs to
have standing to permit us to consider the petition for review.”); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481 (2017) (criticizing the one-plaintiff rule).
61 See Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming June 2019) (manuscript at 93–97, 102 & nn.465–66), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3235637; see also Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative
Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 474–75 (1974); William
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1475 (1988).
62 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 1068–69 (indicating that standing should entail
“substantive judgments concerning the protections that particular provisions of law confer”); id. at 1108 ( “[I]t would be a small step to recognize that, although injury of some
sort is invariantly required, different constitutional and statutory provisions guard against
different kinds of injuries, which therefore require contextual characterization and
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Such cause-of-action analysis has the advantage of clarifying that an
injury, even a significant one, does not necessarily entail that a litigant has a
cause of action to sue the federal government. But focusing on the injuries
that a particular statutory or constitutional provision is specifically designed
to prevent may not significantly restrain state causes of action.63 The lack of
limitation results from the frequent ability of states to claim they are the
intended beneficiaries of constitutional limitations as well as statutory provisions. For example, Article I limitations on congressional power inherently
benefit the regulatory autonomy of states. Some scholars accordingly have
argued that states are perhaps the most interested litigants when there are
structural claims against the federal government, and that states should be
preferred to individuals in challenges to congressional legislation for exceeding congressional authority.64
If one moves from implied actions to enforce the Constitution to the
APA, there have been suggestions that courts at least focus on the actual
interests Congress intended to protect in a statute rather than just interests it
“arguably” protected.65 But the courts would likely be loath to say Congress
had no purpose to protect state interests.66 And such statutorily protected
interests could easily include sovereign interests,67 parens patriae interests,
appraisal”); cf. Woolhandler, supra note 8, at 218–21 (discussing APA suits to address preemption, but not taking a position on their advisability); Woolhandler & Collins, supra
note 9, at 504–06, 511 (suggesting that focus on legally protected interests might provide
some limit on state standing, although indicating that states could often claim their interests were legally protected in the APA context).
63 As Professor Caleb Nelson has pointed out, implied rights of action are no longer
countenanced merely based on a protected-interest test. See Caleb Nelson, Intervention,
106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 74–82) (on file with authors).
64 See Huq, supra note 57, at 1440, 1465, 1490 (arguing that institutional litigants such
as states should be preferred to individuals for litigating structural claims); Crocker, supra
note 8, at 2085 (“Individuals are a grossly inadequate substitute when it comes to asserting
the structural constitutional protections underlying state sovereignty.”); see also Seth Davis,
Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79–80 (2014) (arguing that governments are the most interested parties in structural litigation). Professor Aziz Huq has even
argued that a criminal defendant should not be able to bring a structural challenge to a
law under which she was prosecuted. Huq, supra note 57, at 1440. In a more modest
proposal, Katherine Mims Crocker has argued that “sovereign state standing provides an
important means by which states can claim their rightful position in the American constitutional scheme.” Crocker, supra note 8, at 2100.
65 See supra notes 61–62.
66 See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 624–25 (S.D. Tex.) (indicating that
states’ interests in border protection were within the zone of interests of immigration
laws), aff’d, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S.
Ct. 2271 (2016); cf. Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (not
deciding the zone of interests challenge since it did not go to justiciability).
67 Professor Tara Grove, for example, would allow standing for states when they “challenge federal statutes and regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the continued enforceability of, state law.” Grove, supra note 3, at 855; see id. at 873. While she would
not allow states special standing to challenge the implementation of federal law, she would
allow states to sue if they had interests like those of private parties. Id. at 854 n.15 (indicat-
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and individualized state interests as well. In short, focus on constitutionally
and statutorily protected interests would not effectively limit all-purpose state
standing. And to the extent a focus on more genuinely protected interests
might limit individual standing but not state standing, state-as-plaintiff APA
suits might take over a greater proportion of challenges to federal administrative action as compared to private-party-only suits.
V. A MORE RESTRICTED VIEW

OF

STATE CAUSES

OF

ACTION?

If greater focus on causes of action is to act as a limit on state standing, it
may be necessary to resort to older versions of when states had litigable cases
in the Article III courts. Rather than being favored litigants in the Article III
courts, states should perhaps return to their traditional disfavored status as
plaintiffs. A restrictive version of permissible state causes of action would
entail a strong general presumption against state litigation of their sovereignty interests68 and parens patriae interests. And as to standing based on
interests analogous to individuals, states would be limited to standing where
they are the direct regulatory objects of federal statutes and regulations.
States would be able to challenge, for example, alleged commandeering leg-

ing that she is focusing on instances where a state may bring suit even when a private party
may not). While Grove intended her proposal partly to serve as a limitation on state
claims, it is unclear it would do so. It is common for a federal regulation to trump state law
even without the agency’s making a claim to exclusive power in an area, and such claims
could be brought as sovereignty claims under Grove’s proposal. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 851–54 (2011) (discussing various categories of conflict preemption). For example, the Department of Justice did not purport to provide the exclusive
regulation of physician-assisted suicide in Gonzales v. Oregon, when it issued a regulation
that prescriptions issued to assist suicide were not for a valid medical purpose. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). Relatedly, allegations of agency interference with the
enforcement of state law are relatively easy to allege, given the multiple interactions of
federal and state law. For example, the federal government’s immigration policy to separate children from parents was alleged by the states to interfere with their licensing
schemes for child care. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 52, Washington
v. United States, No. C18-939, 2018 WL 3752220 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2018) (No. 2:18-cv00939), 2018 WL 3139446 (“Defendants’ Policy and subsequent actions harm the States’
sovereign interests by interfering with their licensing authority and rendering the States
unable to honor their own policies favoring family unity.”); id. at 25 (“Attorney General
Sessions also requests an exemption from state licensing requirements . . . .”).
68 They would retain their traditional ability to litigate boundary disputes.
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islation,69 and changes in the Fair Labor Standards Act that would increase
their wage bill for state employees.70
Some might question why the courts should take such a step. If the current injury-in-fact test is taken to define the constitutional contours of a case
and a cause of action, then one may see no problem to be addressed. So
long as a court can find some injury in fact, as well as arguable congressional
authorization in the APA or in some other applicable law, then states can sue
whenever their AGs feel aggrieved. But even if it is not always clear what
defines an Article III case, it is still possible to have a concept of what it is not.
And widespread litigation at the instance of plaintiffs with a virtually unconstrained ability to complain that the public interest is not being served goes
beyond Article III limits.
In this regard, consider whether Congress could promulgate a statute
that purported to authorize states to bring actions under the APA against the
federal government any time they believed the federal executive was acting
contrary to federal statutory71 or constitutional law.72 Such a statute would
seem to run up against the basic proposition that standing doctrine generally
is meant to foreclose such all-purpose advocacy plaintiffs.73 Should such a
prohibition on general-public-interest plaintiffs change because the plaintiff
is a governmental entity rather than a private plaintiff? Consider government enforcement suits. Enforcement actions are the paradigmatic form of
69 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (upholding an anticommandeering challenge to certain aspects of the Affordable Care Act); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). One may criticize this
proposal for treating states as regulatory objects as more entitled to standing than states as
regulatory beneficiaries. But the regulatory-beneficiary category poses no substantial limit
for states as opposed to individuals.
70 See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 524–26 (E.D. Tex.
2016) (holding that states could challenge the narrowing of the “white collar” exemption
from overtime).
71 This would include the range of challenges available under the APA, such as claims
alleging that agency action was arbitrary and capricious.
72 We can add to our general-public-interest-plaintiff statute a provision allowing states
to bring any constitutional challenges to any congressional statute. For simplicity, our
analysis focuses on challenges to executive action. The federal government itself lacks general authority to sue states based on claims that state statutes or policies violate the constitutional or federal statutory rights of citizens. But cf. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387
(2012) (allowing the federal government to sue to enjoin Arizona immigration laws on
preemption grounds). See generally Woolhandler, supra note 8 (criticizing implied actions
by governments to vindicate their sovereignty interests). If Congress purported to give the
federal government such authorization to challenge any state statute or policy alleged to
violate the rights of individuals, one would likely think that it had given the federal executive and the federal courts excessive power to attack state exercises of power without the
necessity of determining private rights. The same would be true of a statute purporting to
give states the ability always to challenge federal legislation. Cf. Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911) (indicating that congressional authorization to challenge a federal
statute alone did not confer constitutional standing).
73 Comparable to the hypothetical statute would be one that allowed the national
political parties to sue under the APA whenever their members’ interests were affected.
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government litigation, taking the traditional form of public power versus private immunity.74 Such government enforcement, however, generally
requires the more or less explicit authorization of the relevant legislature.75
Not even the federal executive enjoys a blanket authorization to bring civil
suits to enforce all federal law.76
By contrast, under the hypothetical general-public-interest statute
described above, states would purportedly have such a blanket authorization
to bring suits against the federal government any time their AGs believed the
federal executive was acting contrary to federal law. True, the statute would
purport to provide congressional authorization, and states would not be
suing individual defendants with liberty and property interests at stake.77 But
Congress’s authorizing the states to serve as the omniplaintiffs to enforce
federal law against the federal government raises concerns of excessively
enhancing the power both of the states and of the federal courts to the detriment of federal executive power. What is more, the absence of individual
rights at stake moves the courts outside of the territory in which the necessity
of deciding issues of private rights justifies judicial pronouncements on the
legality of political branch action.
The argument that states should not be allowed to serve as general-public-interest plaintiffs against the federal government is reinforced by the traditional restriction on parens patriae suits. The federal executive itself is limited
in its ability to sue as a parens patriae plaintiff without congressional authorization,78 which follows from the fact that the federal executive is not authorized to bring civil suits to enforce all federal law. And states traditionally
could claim no parens patriae power to enforce the federal Constitution and
laws against the federal government.79 While the government in suing as
parens patriae purports to represent their citizens who have suffered injuries,
citizens themselves can bring such claims—and in the preferred form of individual immunity against government power. The ban on state sovereignty–based claims against the federal government similarly directed suits
74 The federal executive enforces federal law and the state executive enforces state law
against individuals. In limited circumstances, Congress has authorized states also to bring
civil actions under specific federal statutes. See NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 39–40 (listing
selected federal statutes authorizing state litigation). In addition, Congress has permitted
states to intervene in certain cases in which the constitutionality of their statutes is drawn
into question. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (2012).
75 Criminal statutes generally authorize the appropriate executive officials of the particular sovereignty to prosecute statutorily defined offenses.
76 See generally Davis, supra note 64 (discussing a mixed record of courts in implying
federal and state government rights of action under federal law, and arguing that such
actions should be more readily implied for institutional (sovereignty) interests); see also
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 9, at 434 (discussing the Court’s reluctance to countenance federal suits without statutory authorization).
77 Such concerns may be implicated indirectly, however, in that regulatory beneficiaries are generally seeking greater regulation of individuals.
78 See Woolhandler, supra note 8, at 225–26, 226 n.89.
79 But cf. supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (noting inroads).
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over the legality of government action to this traditional form,80 and limited
the federal courts to deciding issues of the validity of governmental action to
instances in which such a determination was necessary to resolve issues of
private rights.
Of course, the hypothetical statute discussed above is not that far from
what exists under current law. While Congress itself has not explicitly authorized such broad state standing, the Court’s current standing tests as applied
to states have led to comparable results. Thus, it would not help the hypothetical statute if one were to add a requirement that states show an injury in
fact, given that the injury-in-fact test has not provided effective limits on
standing. And if one can agree that the hypothetical statute stretches the
limits of Article III, there might be like concerns when the federal courts in
countenancing states’ suits have similarly expanded their own power by constitutional and statutory construction.
CONCLUSION
The presumptions we have proposed against sovereignty and parens
patriae claims, and limiting states to standing as regulatory objects, would
help to restore some limits on state standing. These presumptions have constitutional and historical roots and have strong normative justifications. They
rely on the proposition that constitutional and statutory limits on the political branches are ultimately for the protection of individuals. The presumptions would reinforce the principle that Article III courts do not exist to
resolve the policy disputes between governments, and that the legitimacy of
courts’ pronouncing on the legality of government actions derives from the
necessity of deciding cases of private rights.

80 See Woolhandler, supra note 8, at 226 (“[S]overeignty based suits may resemble and
substitute for parens patriae suits, and by extension, for individual suits.” (footnote
omitted)).
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